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Abstract
Using an original firm-level dataset and utilizing the incidence of the Egyptian uprising
of 2011, this paper provides an empirical investigation of the effects of firms’ political
connections on employment growth in Egypt. We use the differences in differences (DiD)
framework to compare employment growth in both politically connected firms (PCFs)
and their unconnected counterparts before and after the Egyptian uprising. To minimize
possible bias in the DiD estimation due to dealing with a heterogeneous group of firms,
we apply the propensity score matching (PSM). We find that politically connected firms
have decreased their job creation after the uprising. (JEL: D72, E24, J21)
I INTRODUCTION
Unemployment, especially among youths, has been and continues to be a critical struc-
tural problem for most of the Arab countries even before recent uprisings and political
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turmoil. Such observation was evident during the period of economic reforms and recov-
ery (the 2000s). Through 2002-2008, many of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, and Yemen; achieved
very respectable GDP growth rates (more than 5% on average). However, the overall
unemployment rates were still over 10% and much higher among the young educated
population (over 25%). It is essential to mention that employment growth depends not
only on output growth but also on the elasticity of employment to output, that is, the
employment intensity of such growth. What happened in the Arab countries during the
2000s is a production increase or growth of output but without generating sustained growth
of employment. As a result, the high unemployment rates have persisted and have ex-
cluded large segments of the population from sharing the fruits of growth, and this major
dilemma remains one of the chief factors in the political instability of the region until now.
Egypt is the most populated Arab country, and the most diversified economy has a
unique position and a distinct status in the region. The common saying there, ”As Egypt
goes, so the rest of the Arab countries.” Thus, studying the Egyptian case will have many
implications on most of the region.
Promoting the private sector as the primary employment creator was and still is the
premier policy implication by all international organizations and multilateral financial
institutions. However, the Egyptian government attempt to rely on the private sector to
create enough jobs does not seem to be productive or fruitful to date. The usual explana-
tion for this failure is the nature of the private sector and the type of crony capitalism that
exists in the country. Thus, this paper attempts to highlight job growth within ‘politically
connected’ firms (PCFs) in Egypt.
Recent research on demand for labor has identified the employment creation role of a
handful of fast-growing and young firms. In this literature, ‘gazelles’ are defined as firms
with high growth rates and increasing contribution to employment creation, while ‘turtle’
firms are those of sluggish growth and little or no contribution to job creation 1.
1See Henrekson and Johansson (2010), and the World Bank (2011a,b, 2014a,b)
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Also, a new but growing strand of literature on political connections of the private sector
has identified many benefits that accrue to politically connected firms. Moreover, one
of the pending claims identifies politically connected firms as ‘gazelles.’ Thus, building
on this new body of research, a different set of questions are asked in this study: Do
politically connected firms create more jobs compared to their unconnected counterparts?
Are politically connected firms, turtles, or gazelles? Sahnoun et al. (2014) reports that
gazelle firms mainly generate employment opportunities in the MENA region. In this
study, we focus on politically connected firms and whether or not they contribute to
employment growth in Egypt.
This study addresses the knowledge gap by focusing on how job creation in politically
connected firms responds to shocks to political connections. To do so, we measure the im-
pact of political connections on employment growth using the differences-in-differences
(DiD) framework. To minimize possible bias in the DiD estimation due to dealing with a
heterogeneous group of firms, we apply the propensity score matching (PSM). Besides,
we estimate the quantile DiD at different points in the distribution seeking more insights
into the effects of the Arab Spring on employment growth through the political connec-
tions channel.
Our main findings show that political connections seem to contribute to employment
growth in Egypt. PCFs tend to add more to job creation when compared with uncon-
nected firms. Moreover, employment growth has fallen in PCFs because of the Egyptian
uprising of 2011. Politically connected firms responded to the negative political shock to
their connections (i.e., the Arab Spring and fall of Mubarak’s regime) by reducing job
creation. Finally, our quantile DiD estimations show that these results are driven mainly
by larger firms (in terms of the size of their full-time workers).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview
of relevant literature on both the PCFs and the gazelles concept. Section III presents the
dataset and methodology. The empirical results are summarised in section IV. Section V
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provides a number of robustness checks. Section VI provides a summary and conclusions
while the last section VII proposes an agenda for future research.
II LITERATURE REVIEW
The desire of some firms to seek rents through receiving preferential treatment by govern-
ments (pay no or lower tax rates, receive special treatment in competition for government
contracts, face relaxed regulatory oversight or have their rivals suffer from stiffer regula-
tory oversight) has pushed many firms worldwide to seek political connections. In the
MENA region, the situation is worse due to the absence of “conflict of interests laws” in
most countries. Parliamentarians, Ministers, and sometimes Presidents, their families,
and close friends are controlling a big chunk of the country’s private sector. Monopo-
lizing a specific industry by a politically connected firm and blurring the line between
public and private ownerships is instead a common phenomenon in these countries and
Egypt is no exception.
There is a wide range of literature on corruption, politically connected firms, and cor-
porate unethical behavior. Here we summarize a couple of the recent leading work to
give examples. First and more of a leading survey is Graf and Schulze (2015) where they
indicated that “Corruption research has focused on three fundamental questions: What
determines corruption? What effects does corruption have? Also, what can we do to
reduce corruption effectively and efficiently?” For, recent surveys of the massive works
of corruption, the study referred to Aidt (2003), Svensson (2005), Lambsdorff (2007),
Pande (2007), Olken and Pande (2012), and Kis-Katos and Schulze (2013).
Second, and on the applied side, Faccio et al. (2006) examined 47 countries worldwide
and showed a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who
are connected with national parliaments or governments in 35 countries in the sample.
They concluded that connections diminish when regulations set more limits on officials’
behavior. Additionally, they also, indicated that an announcement of a new political link
results in a significant increase in value.
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Concerning the concept of job growth, we will review here the idea of a fast-growing
firm that is characterized by impressive job creation and positive impact on employment
(Gazelles). The use of the term ‘gazelles’ to describe fast-growing young firms that drive
job growth in the private sector was coined by Birch (1979) who suggested that a sig-
nificant share of new jobs comes from highly innovative small and medium enterprises
(SMEs). By empirically testing this hypothesis for the US, Birch et al. (1997) concluded
that, on average, SMEs create two-thirds of all jobs. Their results were also confirmed in
many studies for Europe, see for example Kirchhoff (1994); Siebert et al. (1999); OECD
(1998); Schreyer (2000). These studies indicate that the percentage of gazelle firms in
Europe varies between 2% and 15%.
However, these studies have received little attention (and even critique2) until several
studies revived it in organizational literature over the past decade. One of the earliest
examples of such revival is the study by Janczak and Bares (2010) which starts by criti-
cizing the lack of attention in business organization literature to high growth firms (as
opposed for example to large firms). Their study examines the growth dynamics of 12
gazelle companies in France. They identify the variables that determine the emergence
and growth of gazelles. Most notably, they found that gazelles are characterized by a
high degree of responsiveness to their customers’ needs, clear operating procedures,
flexibility, structured human resource management, and can efficiently utilize resources
available in their locales.
A similar study by the U.S. Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy pub-
lished in 2008, was entitled “High-Impact Firms: Gazelles”, confirmed the phenomenon
that a small class of firms was responsible for generating the majority of net new jobs in
the USA from 1994 to 2006 (Acs et al., 2008). Henrekson and Johansson (2010) reconfirm
earlier findings that a few rapidly growing gazelles are indeed responsible for the largest
share of job creation. Moreover, using a meta-analysis of twenty studies that focus on
high performing firms, they conclude that gazelles seem to be overrepresented in the
2See for example Brown et al. (1990); Davis et al. (1996, 1998); Haltiwanger and Krizan (1999) for some of
the earlier critiques of Birch’s ‘gazelles’ idea.
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services sector rather than in high-tech industries.
A recent study by Aly et al. (2017) confirms these results for the MENA region except
when it comes to the firm size. The gazelles in the MENA are not necessarily small; the
larger the firm in the MENA region, the more likely it is to be a gazelle. This differ-
ence could be related to the type of business environment that prevails in developing
countries which tends to favor more prominent firms with better resources and political
connections.
We contribute to the vast body of literature on employment growth, especially in the
MENA region by connecting these studies to another strand of research on business-state
relationships. This growing work follows from a seminal paper by Fisman (2001) to link
political connections to firms’ performance as well as other economic outcomes. Faccio
(2010) is an example of this literature, which shows that PCFs benefit from low taxes,
strong market influence, and favorable financial conditions.
Interestingly, the study of the business-state relationship in the MENA region has flour-
ished recently, especially after the eruption of the Arab Spring, see for example Barnett
et al. (2013); Imam and Jacobs (2014); Lassoued and Attia (2014); Rijkers et al. (2017).
Only a few studies have focused on political connections in Egypt, see Diwan and Chekir
(2012); Diwan et al. (2015); Eibl and Malik (2015). None of these studies explained the
effect of political connections on employment growth with Diwan et al. (2015) and Diwan
et al. (2016) as the only exceptions. Diwan et al. (2015) investigate the impact of political
connections under Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and find that PCFs benefit from energy
subsidies and trade protection. Their findings also show a negative impact of political
connections on employment growth. Diwan et al. (2016) for Lebanon report that while
PCFs are large firms that have positive impacts on job creation, they also have negative
impacts on job creation in the unconnected firms. However, none of these studies exploit
the incidence of the Arab uprising to quantify the impact of political connections on
employment growth as we do in this study. The Egyptian uprising in 2011 and what tran-
spired after offers a unique opportunity to contribute to the currently growing number
6
of studies on the state-business relationship in a quasi-natural experiment as described
in section III below.
Moreover, we also contribute to the literature defining political connections. The majority
of current research follows the most widely cited paper of Faccio et al. (2006). The
author establishes political relationships based on whether a firm has at least one of
its significant shareholders or top management who is also a member of parliament,
minister or closely related to a senior politician or party. We add to Faccio et al. (2006)’s
definition of political connections those private companies which were previously owned
by the Egyptian government. The privatization program in Egypt, which started in the
mid-1990s, never had a ‘good’ reputation and had been and continues to be mired in
controversy until today3. In addition to the common belief that public assets have been
sold too cheaply and under-priced, it is believed that political connections and links of
buyers were critical determinants of securing a ‘good’ deal and hence acquiring those
previously owned public assets. This observation should not be, in fact, a surprise,
especially in countries that suffer high levels of corruption and weak institutions.
According to the Transparency International agency, political corruption in Egypt repre-
sents a significant challenge for the country’s political and economic systems. A recent
report, by Wickberg (2015), shows that ‘clientelistic networks’ are a vital source of cor-
ruption in Egypt. Besides, the same report states that corruption also exists inside law
enforcement agencies. Sadly enough, such high levels of political and ‘institutional’
corruption can severely undermine the rule of law. The report even goes further and
points to some recent cases of abusive trials, which places legitimate doubts on the
judiciary system and how it may have become politicized.
Two main most notorious cases of state-owned companies which were subject to priva-
tization can help make our point clear and explain the severity of corruption and the
3In 1991, the government decided to privatize 314 state-owned companies. These companies had about one
million employees and annual revenues equivalent to approximately 15% of GDP.
By the early 2000s, half of these companies were sold with many rumors about and signs of corrupt back-room
deals. Thus, instead of signaling a severe intention from the government for economic reforms, privatization
program in Egypt had become synonymous with corruption and job losses.
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importance of political connections in this context. The first case includes a public steel
company which was sold to a non-famous businessman called Ahmed Ezz. Mr. Ezz, who
later became a very influential member of the Egyptian parliament and a senior leader in
the ruling party then, cornered the market and had been accused of using his political
power and influence to maintain a monopolistic position in the Egyptian steel industry.
The Egyptian government had dismissed two cases of monopolistic behavior against
Mr. Ezz. The second case, which is relatively more recent in 2006, is connected with the
privatization of a widely distributed and large chain called Omar Effendi. Although this
chain of stores was crumbling due to mismanagement and other related issues, it sat on
valuable real estate which was valued at more than one billion pounds. However, Omar
Effendi stores were sold under-priced at nearly half of the of its real estate.
Thus, our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, using an original
dataset, we exploit the incidence of the Egyptian uprising of 2011 to build on a quasi-
experimental environment to measure the short-term effects of a negative shock to firm
political connections on employment. Second, we contribute to the literature defining
political connection such as Faccio et al. (2006) by proposing the possibility of using a
broader definition which takes into account the level of corruption usually associated
with privatization programs in developing countries such as Egypt.
III DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY
To examine the effects of political connections on employment growth, we need a dataset
that provides information on political links as well as firm characteristics before and after
the Egyptian uprising of 2011. Therefore, we compiled a detailed firm-level dataset on
firms’ ownership, employment, and other characteristics. We also collected data on firm’s
top management, members of the 2010 Egyptian parliament, minsters of the Egyptian
government prior the uprising and senior politicians as well as members in the ruling
party under Mubarak’s regime before the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution. To do so,
we combined data retrieved from Orbis, and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases with the
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affluent World Enterprise Survey (WES) conducted and published by the World Bank.
These sources contain a vibrant and detailed set of information on firms’ ownership, the
number of full-time permanent workers for each firm along with other characteristics 4.
We use our dataset to identify whether or not a firm is politically connected and how
job creation responds to a negative shock to political connections. We follow Faccio et al.
(2006) in that a firm becomes politically connected if at least one of its major shareholders
or top management is a member of parliament, minister, or closely related to a senior
politician or party. We add to this, private firms that were publicly owned in the past,
as explained in section II. Both Orbis and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases provide
the information we need to identify the political connection as defined by Faccio et al.
(2006). More specifically, using both databases we were able to identify firms’ names,
top shareholders, the number of full-time workers, sales, in which year a firm was estab-
lished, in which sector it operates and in which geographical region it is based in Egypt.
Besides, we use all available surveys for Egypt in the WES between 2004-2016 and define
all private firms that were publicly owned as politically connected.
By combining data from all of these sources, we build the most substantial unified panel
data on Egyptian firms that we could have. Our dataset covers the period of 2004-2016
for 4008 firms in total, of which there are 544 firms found to be politically connected.
Table 1 shows a summary statistics of our dataset 5.
To capture the possible effect of the Arab Spring on employment growth through pri-
vate firms’ political connections, this study employs the Difference-in-Difference (DiD)
estimation. The DiD strategy compares firms that were politically connected before the
Egyptian uprising with those who have never been politically connected. With this pur-
pose, it is necessary to define a treatment group composed of firms that were politically
4Since there is no way to identify the firm’s name in the WES, we appended the data from different sources.
We then dropped any possible duplicates based on firm characteristics such as the number of employees, size,
sector, and age.
5By using the WES data and taking into consideration the context in which we apply this study when
defining political connections, we contribute to the studies that define political connections. As discussed
earlier, we have a good reason to believe that private firms which were previously owned by the government
are likely to be politically connected.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Var. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
No. Full-time (log) 6350 3.7868 1.5198 0.6931 9.6803
PCF 7594 0.0968 0.2957 0.0000 1.0000
Age 5520 21.5611 16.8470 0.0000 211.0000
Revenue (log) 7594 12.1185 4.8683 0.9163 23.9421
Cairo 7594 0.2730 0.4455 0.0000 1.0000
Delta 7594 0.1323 0.3389 0.0000 1.0000
Upp. Egypt 7594 0.0498 0.2175 0.0000 1.0000
Other regions 7594 0.5449 0.4980 0.0000 1.0000
Table presents the summary statistics of the dataset. It shows descriptive statistics
for the number of full time workers. PCF is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. Age is the firm’s age
which is the difference between the year in which data was reported and the year its
was first established. Revenue (in log form) is used as the value annual total sales
as a measure of the firm’s size. Cairo, Delta, Upper Egypt, and Other regions are
dummies of in which region a firm is based.
connected in 2004-2010, and a control group formed by firms that are neither politically
connected in the period 2004-2010 nor in 2012-2016. The DiD estimator will capture the
differential effect of the Arab Spring on employment growth in politically connected
firms relative to firms in the politically unconnected group. To apply the DiD estimator
all that is necessary is to calculate employment growth in both PCFs (treatment group)
and non-PFCs (control group) both before and after the Egyptian uprising 6.
The simple DiD estimator compares the mean value of employment growth in PCFs
and non-PCFs assuming no systematic differences in any other pre-treatment variable.
Let µit is the mean of employment growth in group i in time t, where i = 0 if the firm
has never been politically connected (control group) and i = 1 if the firm was politically
connected under Mubarak’s regime (treatment group). Define t = 0 as the period before
6It is worth noting that strong and successful firms may attract cronies which could put our identification
strategy under question. However, given the context of Egypt, as explained in the paper where high levels
of corruption prevail, we believe that firms seek political connection to seize policy privileges which allow
them to grow relatively faster. In the meantime, politically unconnected firms in Egypt have fewer chances of
growing as fast as those that are politically connected. Our identification strategy assumes that after the fall
of Mubarak and his ruling party following the 2011 uprising politically connected firms under the Mubarak
regime have received an exogenous and negative shock to their political connections. We understand that
some of the pre-2011 connected firms may have been trying to rebuild their political connection once more,
but this might take a little bit longer. Therefore, our treatment group consists of firms that were politically
connected before 2011 regardless of their status after 2011. Our control group consists of firms that are not
politically connected before or after 2011.
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the Egyptian uprising 2004-2010 (pre-treatment period) and t = 1 as the period after
the uprising 2012-2016 (post-treatment period). A simple DiD estimator can then be
expressed as (µ11 − µ10) − (µ01 − µ00). Where the first bracket is the change in employment
for PCFs before and after the uprising. While the second bracket presents the change
in employment for the non-PFCs between the two periods. The DiD estimator can be
obtained by estimating the following equation:
yit = β0 + β1PCFi + β2S hockt + β3PCFi.S hockt + φXi + it (1)
Where yit is the number of full-time workers; PFCi is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the firm was politically connected in the pretreatment period (2004-2010)
and zero if the firm is not politically connected (control group); S hockt is a dummy
that takes the value of one for the post-treatment period (2012-2016) and zero for the
pretreatment period (2004-2010) and PFCi.S hockt is the interaction term of the previous
dummies, which is just a dummy variable that takes the value of one only for the treat-
ment group in the post-treatment period. The DiD estimator is the OLS estimator of
β3, the coefficient of the interaction term between PFCi and S hockt. Eq. 1 also includes
additional firm characteristics in order to control for observable variables that could
affect employment growth. Thus, Eq. 1 includes Xit, which can be a series of control
variables related to the determinants of firms’ employment growth. These determinants
include the firm’s size, age, sector, and region.
The DiD estimator is expected to be an unbiased estimate of the change in employment
due to a negative shock on politically connected firms. However, such statement is
crucially conditioned on the assumption that both PCFs and non PCFs (treatment and
control groups) reacted to the political shock of 2011 in the same way, except for the
behavior associated to the change in their demand for labor. This assumption may,
however, fail if politically connected firms are different from politically unconnected
ones on some unobservable variables (not included in Xit). In fact, given the substantial
heterogeneity among a large number of firms included in our dataset, one should expect
that both politically connected and politically unconnected firms to be systematically
different. Such fact would violate the main assumption behind the DiD estimator and
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would thus result in biased estimation of the effects of the Arab Spring on employment
through the channel of private firms’ political connections.
To tackle this issue, the current study employs the propensity score matching (PSM) tech-
nique to estimate the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). The PSM methodology
identifies the average treatment effect by comparing employment growth in politically
connected firms and non politically connected firms which, a priori, have similar proba-
bilities of being politically connected. It is worth mentioning though that by doing so, the
PSM technique would help in reducing the bias generated by unobservable confounding
factors, rather than eliminating it (Becker et al., 2002).
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score in our context can be
defined as the conditional probability of receiving a political shock (treatment) given a
set of pretreatment firm characteristics (e.g., firm’s size, age, sector and region), which
can be presented formally as follows:
p(X) ≡ Pr(D = 1|X) = E(D|X) (2)
where D = {0, 1} is an indicator of a firm being politically connected and X is a vector of
pre-shock firm characteristics. For a given propensity score p(Xi) for firm i, the ATT can
be estimated as follows:
τ ≡ E{Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1}
= E[E{Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1, p(Xi)}]
= E[E{Y1i|Di = 1, p(Xi)} − E{Y0i|Di = 0, p(Xi)}|Di = 1]
(3)
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of (p(Xi)|Di = 1) and Y1i and Y0i
are potential employment growth in both counter-factual groups (PCFs and non-PCFs).
Two conditions are important, namely the balancing of the pretreatment variables given
the propensity score and the unconfoundedness condition for a given propensity score.
Defining p(X) as the propensity score, then the first condition can be written as follows.
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D ⊥ X|p(X) (4)
Assuming that being a politically connected firm (treatment group) is unconfounded i.e.,
Y1,Y0 ⊥ D|X, it follows that being subject to the a shock to firms’ political connections
(treatment) is unconfounded given the propensity score, i.e., Y1,Y0 ⊥ D|p(X).
If the first condition is met, observed firms with the same score must have the same dis-
tribution of both observable and unobservable characteristics regardless of their political
connection status. That is, for a given propensity score, being politically connected is
random and therefore treated and control firms should be on average observationally
identical. To estimate the propensity scores, our study employs a probit model that
includes the firm’s size, age, sector, and location. Then, firms that are subject to a shock
(treated firms) are matched.
In addition to the matching-based DiD estimation, we also estimate a quantile DiD
at different points in the distribution. This is aimed at gaining more insights into the
effects of the Arab Spring on employment growth through the political connections
channel. It is, in fact, reasonable and sensible to assume that such effects could be
substantially heterogeneous across firms. Therefore, it is interesting to understand such
heterogeneity by going beyond merely studying the average effect of political connections
on employment growth to also estimate distributional (i.e., quantile) treatment effects of
this relationship.
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The current study employs the difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to examine the
effect of a negative shock to firms’ political connections on employment in Egypt. With
this aim, the treatment group is composed of firms identified with political connections
before the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and the control group is formed by firms which are
not politically connected before or after the uprising. The DiD estimator will capture the
differential effect of the shock on employment through the political connection channel
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relative to politically unconnected firms. The 2011 revolution led Mubarak to step down
and the fall of his regime. We consider this as a negative shock to political connections
of firms that were politically connected before 2011 (treated group). Such collapse is ex-
pected to have adverse effects on job creation by PCFs. However, political instability and
uncertainty arose right after the shock would affect both groups (PCFs and non-PCFs).
Political instability can cause disruptions to the economy, especially job creation as the
associated uncertainty makes it difficult for businesses to plan. More generally, political
instability and uncertainty create a pessimistic atmosphere in which investment expan-
sion is less likely. Our DiD estimation accounts for a quasi-experimental environment
that is expected to capture the impact of this negative shock on employment growth
through the channel of firms’ political connections. Table 2 presents the mean values of
the outcome variable for both control and treatment groups before and after the Egyptian
uprising of 2011.
Table 2: Simple difference in difference (DiD) estimations - No controls
Outcome var. No. Full-Time S. Err. t P>t
Baseline
Control 3.724
Treated 5.378
Diff (T-C) 1.654 0.088 18.75 0.000***
Follow-up
Control 3.576
Treated 4.495
Diff (T-C) 0.918 0.089 10.34 0.000***
Diff-in-Diff -0.736 0.125 -5.88 0.000***
Table shows the difference-in-difference estimator presented in Eq. 1
but with no additional control variables. The outcome variable is the
number of full-time workers. The treatment group consists of firms
that were politically connected before 2011 while the control group
includes firms there are not politically connected before or after the
Egyptian uprising. Baseline represents the period before the Egyptian
uprising (2004-2011) while the follow up represents the post-uprising
period (2011-2016). ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
The DiD estimator is equal to the difference across the two periods (before and after
the uprising) of the difference between treatment and control groups. Differencing the
mean values of the outcome variable between the two periods for the treatment group
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gives the effect of political connections on employment plus the impact of any common
shock such as the global financial crisis (or a time trend) that affects both groups (PCFs
and non-PFCs). The difference between both periods for the control group provides an
estimate of such additional factors. Therefore, differencing the estimate across periods for
PCFs (treatment group) with that of non-PCFs (control group) should offer an estimate
of the effects of political connections on employment growth (i.e., job creation).
Defining period one (2004-2011) as a baseline, employment grew by about 3.7% in non-
PCFs (control group) while in the PCFs (treatment group) this figure was about 5.4 %.
Moving to the post uprising period, it is noted that employment growth has fallen in
both groups. More specifically, employment growth has dropped slightly to 3.6 and 4.5
percentage points in PCFs and non-PCFs (control and treatment groups), respectively.
The simple DiD estimator is equal to - 0.736 percentage points, which is statistically
significant at 1% significance level. This result implies that, on average, firms have
responded to the negative shock to political connections caused by the Egyptian uprising
of 2011 by decreasing their demand for labor. This finding suggests that the additional
reduction in employment growth in PCFs (treatment group) was due to the change in
their political connections (i.e., the 2011 shock).
In addition to the above simple DiD estimation, it may be useful to include other firms
characteristics in order to control for observable variables that could affect the outcome
of interest (i.e., employment growth). Therefore, equation 1 takes account of a number of
control variables, as discussed earlier. Table 3 shows the DiD estimation of equation 1 for
different specifications (models 1-5). Note that model (1) shows the same DiD estimation
of table 2 alongside the estimated coefficients for political connections and the Arab
Spring dummy. The DiD estimation with additional control variables shows similar
results as those reported in table 2. More specifically, when controlling for the firm’s size
(as measured by the value of its annual sales), the DiD estimator shows that employment
in politically connected firms dropped by about 0.227% (model 2) in response to the
shock to their political connection (the Arab Spring). Our DiD estimation does not change
remarkably when controlling for the firm’s age (models 3 and 4) and in which region it is
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based (model 5). The DiD estimation is found to be statistically significant in different
specifications (models 1,2, 4 and 5).
The results in table 3 also show that political connections contribute to employment
growth in Egypt. More specifically, employment growth in politically connected firms
is 1.65% (model 1) or 0.84 (model 4) higher than their unconnected counterparts. The
estimated coefficients for political connections are found to be statistically significant at
1% level in all specifications (models 1-5).
Besides, the results reported in table 3 show that the Arab Spring has caused employ-
ment growth to stumble by around 0.736% (model 1) or 0.352% (model 5) compared to
the period before the Egyptian uprising in 2011. This finding is not surprising and is
expected as political instability, and its associated uncertainty is likely to damage job
creation. Moreover, our results reported in table 3 show that as the firm size measured by
the total value of annual sales (i.e., revenues in log form) increases by 1%, employment
is expected to increase by about 0.17% (model 2) or 0.211% (models 4 and 5), all else
equal. The impact of the firm’s size on its employment growth is found to be statistically
significant at 1% significance level.
Moreover, older firms are expected to have a higher demand for labor. According to
model (2) estimation in table 3, for example, as a firm’s age increases by one year, its
employment level is expected to grow by 0.204%. We have also grouped firms according
to their age into three groups (less than ten years old, between 10-50 years old, and older
than 50 years). Yet, we observe a similar pattern regarding the relationship between a
firm’s age and its demand for labor. More specifically, firms that are between 10 and
50 years old are expected to have 0.29% higher demand for labour than that of firms
younger than ten years old (our reference group). Similarly, employment growth in firms
that are more than 50 years old is likely to be 1.65% higher (model 5) than that of firms
less than ten years old, ceteris paribus. The impact of a firm’s age on its employment
growth is found to be statistically significant at 1% significance level. 7
7Though, it is worth noting that interpreting the estimated coefficient of age should come with a caution.
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Furthermore, model (5) estimation reported in table 3 introduces several dummy vari-
ables to control for regional effects. Based on which region a firm is located, firms are
grouped into four regions: Cairo, Delta Egypt, Upper Egypt, and other regions. Taking
Cairo as a reference group, we find that employment growth is lower in firms that are
based either on Delta Egypt or Upper Egypt when compared to other firms which are
based on Cairo. However, such difference is found to be statistically significant only in
the case of Upper Egypt.
Given the substantial heterogeneities existing among firms in both groups (control and
treatment), the DiD estimation is likely to be biased. To account for such possible bias,
we employ the propensity score matching (PSM), thereby maximizing the observable
similarity between PCFs and non-PCFs (treatment and control groups). As an alternative
to linear regression, the PSM analysis allows us to create the two groups that have similar
characteristics so that a comparison can be made within these matched groups. Imple-
mentation of the PSM methodology follows the two-step procedure whereby in the first
step, each firm’s probability (propensity score) of receiving a political shock is assessed
conditional to a set of explanatory variables. We include the firm’s size as measured
by revenues, age, and in which region and sector it operates as controls within the first
stage of the model to ensure that the two groups are matched on similar characteristics
8. Consequently, the treatment and control group firms are matched based on their
The firm’s age could itself be an indicator of political connections. More specifically, the age variable which
could be correlated with barriers to entry and first-mover advantages could turn into political connections.
Moreover, it could also raise concerns about endogeneity bias. This is why we estimated the model with and
without firms’ age. Our results, in either case, seem to be similar where there are no significant changes in the
sign or the magnitude of estimated coefficients. Caution needs to consider when drawing on our interpretation
of the estimated coefficient of the firm’s age and its effect on employment growth.
8Ideally, we would like to implement the matching exercise (and calculate the propensity score) based on as
many firm characteristics as possible in order to further reduce the bias arising from comparing two groups
with systematic differences. This matching outcome would be of even better quality when including more
continuous variables in the probit model. Unfortunately, the number of firm characteristics in our dataset
is limited, and the majority of these variables are dummies. Therefore, we believe the inclusion of firm size
(log of revenue) would relatively improve our matching outcome. Moreover, firms of similar size (perhaps
relatively bigger size) would be more likely to receive the treatment (i.e., political connection).
Thus, we believe it is a sensible choice to include firm size as one of the firm characteristics based on which
we implement the matching procedure. However, for the sake of argument, we dropped firm size from our
probit model and re-estimated the model based on the new propensity scores, and our results did not change
significantly. We omit these results from the paper for brevity and not to distract the reader in too much detail.
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference estimations - Additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political Conn. 1.654*** 0.860*** 1.065*** 0.834*** 0.839***
(0.0882) (0.0804) (0.110) (0.0773) (0.0773)
Arab Spring -0.148*** -1.194*** -0.190*** -0.918*** -0.879***
(0.0395) (0.0431) (0.0493) (0.0430) (0.0441)
DiD -0.736*** -0.227* -0.224 -0.370*** -0.352**
(0.125) (0.112) (0.142) (0.107) (0.107)
Revenue (log) 0.170*** 0.211*** 0.211***
(0.00407) (0.00437) (0.00438)
Age 0.204***
(0.0258)
10-50 years 0.287*** 0.290***
(0.0441) (0.0443)
>50 years 1.163*** 1.165***
(0.0534) (0.0534)
Delta Egypt -0.0528
(0.0540)
Upper Egypt -0.295***
(0.0804)
Other Regions 0.00794
(0.0387)
Cons. 3.724*** 2.230*** 3.224*** 1.083*** 1.081***
(0.0249) (0.0421) (0.0824) (0.0661) (0.0713)
N 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350
The outcome variable is number of full-time workers. Political Connection is a dummy
that takes the value of one if a firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. Arab
Spring is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period 2011-2016 and
zero for the period 2004-2010. DiD is the difference-in-difference estimator as shown in
Eq. 1, including control variables. Revenue (in log form) is used as the value annual
total sales as a measure of the firm’s size. Age is the firm’s age which is the difference
between the year in which data was reported and the year its was first established. 10-
50 years is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s age falls between
10 and 50 years. > 50 years is a dummy variables that takes the value of one if a firm is
older than 50 years. The reference group is firms of 10 years or less. Delta, Upper Egypt,
and Other regions are dummies of in which region a firm is based. Cairo is the reference
group for other regions. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes a statistically significant coefficient at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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propensity scores.
We first demonstrate the validity of the parallel trend assumption and the quality of our
matching exercise before proceeding to present our PSM-based DiD estimates. In this
context, the parallel trend assumption is essential to ensure the internal validity of the
DiD estimation. If this assumption is violated, it will lead to a biased estimate of the
causal effect. The parallel trend assumption probably remains the hardest to fulfill. In
short, this assumption requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference between
politically connected firms (our treatment group) and politically unconnected group
(control) to be constant over time before the intervention/treatment (the 2011 uprising
in our case). However, since there is no formal statistical test to examine the validity of
this assumption, most studies tend to rely on simple visual inspection of the outcome
variable (mean value) over a few points before the intervention. Therefore, we plot
observed outcome trends of both groups (control and treatment) during two points in
time both before (2004&2008) and after (2013&2016) the incidence of the 2011 uprising
(intervention/treatment) (see Fig. 1). The figure shows that the parallel trend assumption
may seem to hold before 2011 9.
Figure 1: Pre-treatment parallel trends - employment (mean values)
9It may be worth noting that this assumption is more likely to hold when tested over a shorter period
anyway
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Moreover, in order to demonstrate the quality of our matching exercise, we compare
means between treated and non-treated groups before and after matching. Fig. 2 shows
a standardized percentage of bias across covariates before and after matching. We also
report, in table 4, a set of t-tests for the difference in mean of our covariates before
and after matching along with the percentage of bias reduction due to our matching
procedure. Fig. 2 and table 4 show that our matching procedure has been successful
at reducing the bias arising from comparing two groups with systematic differences.
Finally, we plot our propensity scores before and after matching (see Fig. 3
Figure 2: Standardized % bias across covariates (before and after matching)
Turning to our PSM-DiD estimation, we present the results in table 5 based on the kernel
matching method based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replications. As explained
earlier, this procedure involves taking each politically connected firm (treated) and identi-
fying politically unconnected firms (non-treated) with the most similar propensity scores.
As the linear regression estimates in table 5, the matching results in table 5 suggest that a
negative shock to firms’ political connections in Egypt has dropped employment growth,
on average, by 1.34% as a response to the shock after the Arab Spring. The estimated
DiD coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level. It is interesting though
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Table 4: Bias reduction after matching
Unmatched Mean t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias % Reduct t p>t
Revenue (log) U 16.246 13.851 67.200 12.430 0.000
M 16.236 15.913 9.100 86.500 1.400 0.161
Age U 33.062 27.457 31.600 6.430 0.000
M 32.923 33.054 -0.700 97.700 -0.090 0.930
10-50 years U 0.835 0.922 -27.000 -5.780 0.000
M 0.837 0.842 -1.600 94.100 -0.200 0.841
> 50 years U 0.165 0.078 27.000 5.780 0.000
M 0.163 0.158 1.600 94.100 0.200 0.841
Delta Egypt U 0.212 0.158 14.000 2.740 0.006
M 0.213 0.202 2.800 80.300 0.380 0.707
Upper Egypt U 0.116 0.066 17.400 3.610 0.000
M 0.116 0.127 -3.600 79.400 -0.450 0.655
Other Regions U 0.410 0.499 -18.000 -3.360 0.001
M 0.411 0.422 -2.300 87.400 -0.330 0.745
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replications; PSM is based on a probit model
that includes firm’s size, age, sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient at 1% level.
(a) Propensity Score BEFORE Matching (b) Propensity Score AFTER Matching
Figure 3: Propensity score for treated and control group
to see the magnitude of the estimated DiD coefficient increasing as we account for (or
reduce) possible bias.
Finally, we also report the quantile DiD estimations in table 6, which helps us to gain
more understanding of the effects of the Arab Spring on employment growth through
the political connections channel. We are interested in exploring whether such effects
are substantially heterogeneous across politically connected firms. Thus, we go beyond
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Table 5: DiD estimation after matching (PSM)
Outcome var. No. Full-Time S. Err. t P>t
Baseline
Control 3.856
Treated 5.566
Diff (T-C) 1.71 0.166 10.3 0.000***
Follow-up
Control 4.545
Treated 4.914
Diff (T-C) 0.369 0.322 1.15 0.251
Diff-in-Diff -1.34 0.354 3.79 0.000***
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replica-
tions; PSM is based on a probit model that includes firm’s size, age,
sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient at 1%
level.
the average effects of firms’ political connection on employment growth (see tables 2-5
to also estimate distributional (i.e., quantile) treatment effects at different points in the
distribution, see table 6.
Table 6: Quantile DiD estimations after matching (PSM)
Outcome var. No. Full-Time S. Err. t P>t
DiD 0.10 0.981 0.355 2.77 0.006***
DiD 0.20 -0.264 0.543 0.49 0.627
DiD 0.30 -0.458 0.435 1.05 0.292
DiD 0.40 -0.928 0.374 2.48 0.013**
DiD 0.50 -1.349 0.424 3.18 0.001***
DiD 0.60 -1.521 0.547 2.78 0.005***
DiD 0.70 -1.081 0.54 2 0.045**
DiD 0.80 -1.284 0.355 3.62 0.000***
DiD 0.90 -1.792 0.422 4.25 0.000***
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replica-
tions; PSM is based on a probit model that includes firm’s size, age,
sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient at 1%
level.
Table 6 shows the quantile DiD estimation after matching. It shows the treatment effects
at 0.10 to 0.90 points in the distribution. While the quantile based DiD estimations
confirm our previous findings (i.e., the negative impact of the Egyptian uprising on
employment in PCFs), they also show an interesting pattern. Except for the lowest 10%,
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the estimated treatment effect is negative at all points in the distribution. These impacts
are statistically significant almost at all points. More interestingly, the magnitude of
the estimated becomes larger as we move up on the distribution. This implies that our
results are driven mainly by larger firms.
V ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
As we have shown earlier, the DiD estimation is simply the difference in mean of em-
ployment growth across the pre- and post-shock periods. We have also discussed how
the DiD estimator accounts for the effect of other shocks such as the global financial crisis
(GFC) (as well as any additional time-specific effects) when estimating the impact of
political connections on employment growth. It should be now clear that this is done
in the context the DiD estimator by differencing mean values of the outcome variable
between the treatment and control groups. Then, these ‘additional’ common effects (or
shocks) are removed when taking the difference between before and after the Egyptian
uprising. Besides, our matching based DiD is expected to take care of any bias based on
dealing with a quite heterogeneous group of a large number of firms.
However, despite all efforts to account for possible bias through performing the PSM-
based DiD estimation based on a bunch of firm-level characteristics, there could be still
concerns about accounting for the pre-treatment trends. One way to address this concern
could be through implementing the matching on lagged values of firm characteristics
(2,3 or 4 years before the intervention) rather than contemporaneous values. To show
that our results are not sensitive to pre-treatment trends, we report here, see table 7, the
DiD estimation after computing propensity scores based on the lagged value of sales (not
current values as the previous case). Our results, presented in table 7, did not change
significantly. The estimated DiD coefficient has the same sign and slightly larger in
magnitude.
Furthermore, other concerns could be related to the possibility that our estimation cap-
tures the effect of other shocks along with the impact of political shocks on employment
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Table 7: DiD estimation after matching (PSM- on lag revenue)
Outcome var. No.Full-Time S.Err t P>t
Baseline
Control 4.165
Treated 5.543
Diff(T-C) 1.379 0.140 9.820 0.000***
Follow-up
Control 0.140
Treated 4.914
Diff(T-C) -0.189 0.330 0.330 0.567
Diff-in-Diff -1.568 0.378 4.150 0.000***
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replications;
PSM is based on a probit model that includes lagged value of firm’s rev-
enue, age, sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient
at 1% level.
growth. More specifically, the effect of the global financial crisis is the primary concern
here since our data includes the economic shocks years (2007 & 2008). In this instance, if
PCFs and non-PCFs respond differently to the financial shock, this could be picked up to
some extent in our previous estimation. For example, since that, the effect of the global
financial crisis on domestic (and foreign firms operating in Egypt) will be mainly through
exports, and assuming that PCFs were large exporters, then ignoring this could, in fact,
pick more than just the effect of political shocks on employment growth. Thus, not taking
firm exporting activities into account may have forced the PCF to respond to the global
financial crisis in the same way as the non-PCFs do. In this case, equating the effect of
the common shock of the financial crisis between both groups (treated and control) is
underestimating the loss in employment that is not due to political connections instead of
the mere fact of being an exporter. Accordingly, and if this is true, our previous estimates
might have overestimated the effects of political connections on employment growth in
Egypt, especially if a large number of firms which produce to the domestic markets are
protected (non-exporters).
To address this issue, we undertake several robustness checks. First, we add the per-
centage of sales which are directly exported and -re-estimate models (1-5) along with
considering the new export variable among the characteristics based on which we match
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firms. Second, rather than finding the percentage of sales for exports, we create a dummy
variable which equals one if the firm is involved in exporting activities and zero other-
wise. We then reproduce our previous estimates. Third, we re-estimate our DiD results
using a sub-sample which does not include the years of the global financial crisis (2007 &
2008).
While tables A1 - A5 in the appendix show the detailed results for our replication exercise
of Tables 3 and 5, Table 8 below presents the DiD estimated coefficients across these
additional specifications. The first and second rows in Table 8 show the DiD coefficients
when we replicate our results presented earlier in Tables 3 and 5 after controlling for firm
exporting activities. While exports are measured as a percentage of the firm sales across
different specifications in the row, they take the form of a dummy variable (equals one
if a firm exports part of its sales and zero otherwise) across model specifications in the
second row. The third row in Table 8 shows the DiD coefficients when we reproduce the
full sample results (in Tables 3 and 5) on a sub-sample only. Our sub-sample excludes the
years of the global financial crisis (2007-2008). The PSM-DiD column in Table 3 presents
our DiD coefficient after matching. Standard errors for the PSM-DiD estimation are
based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replications, and the PSM is based on a probit
model which in addition to our usual controls (firm’s size, age, sector, and region) it
controls for exports (first and second rows).
VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature studying the economic effects of firms’ political
connections. Our main research objectives include: i) measuring the short-term effects
of a shock to political connections on employment growth in Egypt; ii) investigating
whether politically connected firms (PCFs) create more jobs compared to their uncon-
nected counterparts (non-PCFs); and iii) by defining gazelles as fast-growing and young
firms with increasing contribution to employment creation as opposed to turtles which
are old firms with sluggish growth and little or no contribution to job creation, we aim
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Table 8: DiD estimations with exports (% sales & dummy) and for a subsample
Additional Control Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 PSM-DiD
DiD controlling for -0.690*** -0.269** -0.263* -0.369*** -0.356*** -0.739**
Exports (% sales) (0.114) (0.104) (0.130) (0.102) (0.102)
Additional Control Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 PSM-DiD
DiD controlling for -0.690*** -0.324** -0.206 -0.414*** -0.400*** -0.901***
Exports (Dummy) (0.109) (0.102) (0.124) (0.100) (0.100)
Sub-Sample Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
DiD excluding GFC -1.470*** -0.997*** 0 -1.035*** -0.991***
(Years 2007-2008) (0.299) (0.206) (.) (0.206) (0.204)
The table sumarises our DiD estimations when replicating the results presented in Tables 3 and 5 (discussed in
Section IV) after altering the model specification of Eq. 1 as a means of robustness checks. This is an extra measure
to take into account the effects of the global financial crisis on employment. Detailed results are presented in
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 in the appendix. The outcome variable is the number of full-time workers. In
addition to accounting for the firm’s revenues (in log form), age (years and dummies), and location, we control for
exports in models (6 through to 15) and reproduce our full sample results on a sub-sample (after excluding the
global financial crisis years 2007 & 2008). PSM-DiD is the DiD coefficient after matching. Standard errors for the
PSM-DiD estimation are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replications, and the PSM is based on a probit
model which in addition to our usual controls (firm’s size, age, sector, and region) it controls for exports (first and
second rows). ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient at 1% level.∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes a statistically significant
coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
to identify whether PFCs in Egypt are turtles or gazelles? In the sense of whether PCFs
contribute more than non-PCFs to employment creation.
For this purpose, we use an original firm-level database and utilize the incidence of the
Egyptian uprising of 2011. Our unique dataset covers 4008 firms between 2004-2016,
of which we were able to identify 544 politically connected firms. Different sources
(e..g., Orbis, Thomson Reuters Eikon, WES) were used to compile such large dataset,
which contains information on a firm’s political connections, the number of full-time
workers, annual sales, age, in which region and sector it is based. Thus, we set-up a
quasi-natural experiment environment in which we exploit the incidence of the Arab
Spring in 2011 as an exogenous shock to measure the short-term impacts of a negative
shock to firms’ political connections on employment. More specifically, we employ the
difference-in-difference (DiD) technique to investigate the effect of the Arab spring on
employment growth through the channel of firms’ political connections.
Our DiD estimator compares employment growth in PCFs before 2011 (treatment group),
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which were subject to a negative shock to their political connections, with firms that are
not politically connected either before or after the Egyptian uprising (control group).
This captures the possible effect of the Egyptian revolution on employment through
the firm’s political connections channel. We find that connected firms before the shock
decreased their job creation after the uprising. This implies that employment growth
declined after politically connected firms have received a negative shock to their political
connections.
The results are not surprising since Ramalho (2007) documented a long-term drift in
performance of the connected firms in the year following the collapse of connections (In
this case with Brazilian President Collor de Mello).
The DiD estimation procedure assumes that both treatment and control groups have
no systematic differences in any other pre-treatment variable. We find this an extreme
assumption since firms in our dataset are heterogeneous and therefore expected to be
of different characteristics, which would result in a biased DiD estimation. We address
this issue by complementing our DiD analysis by the propensity score matching (PSM)
approach. The PSM approach identifies the average treatment effect by comparing
employment growth in PCFs and other firms that, a priori, have similar characteristics.
That is, for a given propensity score, receiving a political shock is random and therefore
treated, and control firms should be on average observationally similar. To obtain the
propensity scores, we employ a probit model based on firm-specific characteristics. Our
PSM analysis confirms our results from the DiD estimation.
To gain more insights on how our results may differ across the distribution, we com-
plement our PSM estimation with a quantile DiD regression-based analysis. Our key
findings are as follows. Political connections seem to contribute to employment growth
in Egypt. Employment growth had fallen as a result of the Egyptian uprising in 2011.
Politically connected firms responded to the negative shock to their connections (i.e., the
Arab Spring and fall of Mubarak’s regime) by reducing their job creation. The quantile
DiD estimations show an interesting pattern - the results are driven mainly by larger
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firms.
Our results confirm the findings in Aly et al. (2017) in that, unlike other regions, gazelles
in MENA countries are not necessarily small. Our conclusions for Egypt show that
the bigger the firm is, the more likely it is to be a gazelle. Our results support the
claim that this difference between MENA countries and other regions is related to the
type of business environment that prevails in Egypt (and possibly other developing
countries) which tends to favor more prominent firms with better resources and political
connections. That is, according to our findings for Egypt, political links are essential for
job creation.
VII FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Further research areas that need to be pursued include but not limited to, the role of
transparent labor market regulations, enactments of conflict of interests laws, along with
political activeness of watch-Dog NOGs and groups in reducing number of PCFs and
eliminating the reasons/incentives for their mere existences. How access to foreign
markets; free trade practices, exercising of corporate social responsibility; and improving
the conditions for starting a new business and attracting foreign investment may reduce
PCFs number and influence on the economy. Is it true that PCFs prevent or hinder other
firms from growing and creating more employment?
On the Gazelles side of the study, how all of the aforementioned factors may contribute
to the creation of more gazelles in the Egyptian market. In addition, the dynamics of
becoming a gazelle need to be studied further. Not only the profile of a gazelle firm
needs to be fully drawn but also the period that takes a firm to move to the gazelle rank.
Does a firm become a gazelle right after inception? What is the average number of years
a firm will take to become a gazelle or a turtle? Is there a typical move from the gazelle
rank to the turtle or vice versa? Besides, what is the average number of workers a firm
might employ before moving to the Gazelle rank? Additionally, can we ever break from
the gazelle/turtle dichotomy and see a more evenly distributed (less skewed) job growth
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across all firms? These are all questions that might help the government target specific
firms with their job creation policies.
However, a piece of research that could very well fill a vacuum in the literature has to do
with the interplay between firm-characteristics, firm’s performance, sector-characteristics,
and the overall institutional quality (North, 1990). Such research might answer the
following questions: Does the importance of being “politically connected” depend on
sector characteristics especially institutions-intensity? Do political connections influence
the likelihood of being a turtle (gazelle), and if yes, does the importance of political
relationships vary across sectors? An interaction between the measure of “firm-political
connection” and sector-institutional intensity could answer this question. Actually, in
so doing, a study will able to speak to the responses of firm employment growth to
institutional frictions and political connections. Also, sector institutional dependence
data that might be sourced from Nunn (2007), while data on skill and capital intensities
of production would be calculated using the approach of Berman et al. (1994).
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Table A1: Difference-in-difference estimations - Additional controls including exports (% sales)
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Political Connection 1.548*** 0.897*** 1.026*** 0.876*** 0.883***
(0.0802) (0.0748) (0.101) (0.0733) (0.0733)
Arab Spring 0.0107 -0.906*** -0.187*** -0.758*** -0.721***
(0.0361) (0.0410) (0.0453) (0.0412) (0.0423)
DiD -0.690*** -0.269** -0.263* -0.369*** -0.356***
(0.114) (0.104) (0.130) (0.102) (0.102)
export 0.0215*** 0.0172*** 0.0273*** 0.0149*** 0.0149***
(0.000585) (0.000543) (0.000978) (0.000556) (0.000556)
Revenues (log) 0.144*** 0.173*** 0.174***
(0.00387) (0.00437) (0.00438)
Age 0.208***
(0.0238)
10-50 years 0.312*** 0.314***
(0.0418) (0.0420)
>50 years 0.844*** 0.847***
(0.0520) (0.0520)
Delta Egypt -0.0961
(0.0512)
Upper Egypt -0.279***
(0.0762)
Other Regions -0.0103
(0.0366)
Cons. 3.406*** 2.205*** 3.007*** 1.379*** 1.391***
(0.0243) (0.0391) (0.0762) (0.0636) (0.0686)
N 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350
The outcome variable is number of full-time workers. Political Connection is a dummy that
takes the value of one if a firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. Arab Spring is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period 2011-2016 and zero for the period
2004-2010. DiD is the difference-in-difference estimator as shown in Eq. 1, including control
variables. Revenue (in log form) is used as the value annual total sales as a measure of the
firm’s size. Age is the firm’s age which is the difference between the year in which data was
reported and the year its was first established. 10-50 years is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the firm’s age falls between 10 and 50 years. > 50 years is a dummy variables
that takes the value of one if a firm is older than 50 years. The reference group is firms of
10 years or less. Delta, Upper Egypt, and Other regions are dummies of in which region a
firm is based. Cairo is the reference group for other regions. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes a statistically
significant coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A2: DiD estimation after matching (PSM) - including exports (% sales)
Outcome var. No. Full employ S. Err. t P>t
Baseline
Control 3.872
Treated 5.518
Diff (T-C) 1.647 0.166 9.9 0.000***
Follow-up
Control 3.997
Treated 4.904
Diff (T-C) 0.907 0.311 2.92 0.003***
Diff-in-Diff -0.739 0.348 2.13 0.033**
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 repli-
cations; PSM is based on a probit model that includes firm’s size,
age, sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coeffi-
cient at 1% level.
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Table A3: Difference-in-difference estimations - Additional controls including (exports = 1 or 0)
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Political Connection 1.311*** 0.801*** 0.755*** 0.791*** 0.803***
(0.0773) (0.0735) (0.0968) (0.0721) (0.0720)
Arab Spring -0.0762* -0.865*** -0.206*** -0.719*** -0.673***
(0.0345) (0.0404) (0.0432) (0.0406) (0.0417)
DiD -0.690*** -0.324** -0.206 -0.414*** -0.400***
(0.109) (0.102) (0.124) (0.100) (0.100)
ExDummy 1.751*** 1.359*** 1.813*** 1.203*** 1.208***
(0.0392) (0.0384) (0.0503) (0.0390) (0.0390)
Revenues (log) 0.125*** 0.157*** 0.157***
(0.00392) (0.00443) (0.00444)
Age 0.164***
(0.0226)
10-50 years 0.264*** 0.271***
(0.0411) (0.0413)
> 50 years 0.812*** 0.815***
(0.0511) (0.0510)
Delta Egypt -0.121*
(0.0504)
Upper Egypt -0.280***
(0.0749)
Other Regions 0.0187
(0.0360)
Cons. 3.343*** 2.324*** 3.028*** 1.514*** 1.511***
(0.0234) (0.0385) (0.0723) (0.0632) (0.0679)
N 6350 6350 6350 6350 6350
The outcome variable is number of full-time workers. Political Connection is a dummy
that takes the value of one if a firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. Arab
Spring is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period 2011-2016 and zero
for the period 2004-2010. DiD is the difference-in-difference estimator as shown in Eq. 1,
including control variables. Revenue (in log form) is used as the value annual total sales as
a measure of the firm’s size. Age is the firm’s age which is the difference between the year
in which data was reported and the year its was first established. 10-50 years is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s age falls between 10 and 50 years. > 50
years is a dummy variables that takes the value of one if a firm is older than 50 years. The
reference group is firms of 10 years or less. Delta, Upper Egypt, and Other regions are
dummies of in which region a firm is based. Cairo is the reference group for other regions.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes a statistically significant coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A4: DiD estimation after matching (PSM) - including (exports = 1 or 0)
Outcome var. No. Full Employ S. Err. t P>t
Baseline
Control 4.24
Treated 5.484
Diff (T-C) 1.244 0.159 7.85 0.000***
Follow-up
Control 4.562
Treated 4.904
Diff (T-C) 0.343 0.307 1.12 0.264
Diff-in-Diff -0.901 0.339 2.66 0.008***
Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the model 1000 replica-
tions; PSM is based on a probit model that includes firm’s size, age,
sector, and region. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significant coefficient at
1% level.
Table A5: Difference-in-difference estimations - Sub-sample (excluding years 2007 & 2008)
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Political Connection 2.389*** 1.135*** 0.841*** 1.144*** 1.140***
(0.286) (0.198) (0.0920) (0.197) (0.195)
Arab Spring 0.143* -3.471*** 0 -3.325*** -3.118***
(0.0629) (0.0737) (.) (0.108) (0.110)
DiD -1.470*** -0.997*** 0 -1.035*** -0.991***
(0.299) (0.206) (.) (0.206) (0.204)
Revenues (log) 0.464*** 0.461*** 0.462***
(0.00765) (0.00765) (0.00757)
Age 0.207***
(0.0326)
10-50 years 0.243*** 0.275***
(0.0448) (0.0446)
¿50 years 0.294** 0.384***
(0.0895) (0.0900)
Delta Egypt -0.126*
(0.0618)
Upper Egypt -0.197**
(0.0696)
Other Regions 0.221***
(0.0504)
cons 3.433*** 0.103 3.028*** -0.167 -0.488***
(0.0550) (0.0667) (0.0925) (0.111) (0.128)
N 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326
The outcome variable is number of full-time workers. Political Connection is a dummy
that takes the value of one if a firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. Arab
Spring is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period 2011-2016 and zero
for the period 2004-2010. DiD is the difference-in-difference estimator as shown in Eq. 1,
including control variables. Revenue (in log form) is used as the value annual total sales as
a measure of the firm’s size. Age is the firm’s age which is the difference between the year
in which data was reported and the year its was first established. 10-50 years is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s age falls between 10 and 50 years. > 50
years is a dummy variables that takes the value of one if a firm is older than 50 years. The
reference group is firms of 10 years or less. Delta, Upper Egypt, and Other regions are
dummies of in which region a firm is based. Cairo is the reference group for other regions.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes a statistically significant coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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